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This paper examines how expected attachment to the labor market and expected tenure at a specific firm 
affect training participation. The results, based on cross-sectional data from Japan, indicate that expected 
attachment to the labor market affects participation in both employer- and worker-initiated training, while 
expected tenure at a specific firm mainly explains participation in employer-initiated training. These two 
attachment indices explain almost half of the gender gap in training participation. Employers in a less 
competitive labor market are more likely to offer employer-initiated training to their workers. 
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Job training and skill development play a central role in the formation of job skills and subsequent 
wage growth (e.g., Kurosawa, 2001; Kawaguchi, 2006). Although the share of women and nonregular 
employees in the workforce has steadily  increased  in Japan,  their  job-training opportunities remain 
substantially  limited when compared to those of male and regular employees  (Hara, Kurosawa, and 
Yamamoto (2009) and Kosugi and Kimura (2009)).     
The lower rate of training participation among female and nonregular workers is often attributed to their 
shorter expected periods of labor-force participation or job tenure with a specific firm. Indeed, theory 
suggests that these expected lengths are important determinants for the quantity of human-capital 
investment, because the strength of labor-market attachment and expected job tenure determine the length 
of time that agents can reap returns to their human-capital investment. In particular, when human capital 
is firm-specific for technological reasons or labor-market friction, the costs involved in human-capital 
investment will be paid by firms or shared between firms and employees (Hashimoto 1980, Stevens 1994, 
Chang and Wang 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999). Under these circumstances, to secure their 
investment, firms are likely to invest more in employees whom they expect to stay at the firm for a longer 
time.   
These predictions of human-capital theory are well known, but empirical tests of these predictions are 
scarce. One notable exception that directly tests these predictions is Royalty (1996), who used panel data 
from  the  National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979  (NLSY79)  of the United States to estimate 
job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment turnover probabilities and showed that the estimated probabilities 
well explain  the probability of receiving training.  Lowenstein  and Spletzer (1997) offered  indirect 
evidence consistent with theoretical predictions. They claimed that both employers and employees have 
an incentive to delay the timing of formal on-the-job training, because they postpone it until they learn the 
quality of the current employer-employee match. Once both sides learn that the match is good and expect 
the relationship to last for a long period, both sides start to invest in human capital. Lowenstein and 
Spletzer indeed found that on-the-job training tends to take place after a few years of job tenure, even 
after conditioning on the years of completed job tenure to control for the quality of job match, based on 
the NLSY79. Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) empirically investigated the relation between labor-market 
competition and employer-provided training and found that employer-provided training in the United 
Kingdom occurs less frequently in economically denser areas and argued that poaching and turnover  
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effects of agglomeration discourage employers from providing training.   
This paper proposes an alternative test of the theoretical prediction relying on a single cross-sectional 
data set of the Employment Status Survey 2007 under a stationarity assumption. We first calculate an 
“attachment index” for each worker, that is, how long each worker is expected to stay in the labor market 
until retirement, by adding up the average hours worked until the standard retirement age for each of the 
worker’s attributes. In addition, we similarly calculate each worker’s expected “remaining tenure,” that is, 
how many more years each worker is expected to continue to work at the current firm, based on workers' 
observable characteristics. Greater attachment to the labor market as a whole implies a longer payoff 
period for investment in general human capital, and this should increase job training initiated by both 
employers and workers. At the same time, longer remaining tenure implies a longer payoff period for 
firm-specific human-capital investment, and this should increase employer-initiated training. We then 
examine to what extent differences in indices in general labor-market attachment and in specific-firm 
attachment explain differences in the participation rate of employer- and worker-initiated trainings by sex, 
education, and regular/nonregular employment status. The relation between the expected length of job 
tenure and employer-initiated job training is predicted to be stronger in labor markets with more 
significant labor-market friction, because firms can exploit higher rents from human-capital investment. 
We construct proxy variables for labor-market friction and examine how the relation between expected 
tenure and employer-initiated training differs by the degree of labor-market friction. 
The main findings  of our analysis are as follows. First, job-training probabilities for female, less 
educated, and nonregular workers are smaller than for the respective reference groups when we hold 
workers’ age, size of employer, tenure, industry, and occupation constant. The difference is particularly 
large for employer-initiated training. In contrast, with regard to worker-initiated training, there is almost 
no difference by sex, and differences by workers’ age and size of employer are also small. Second, 
whereas the predicted future-employment period overall affects  participation in both employer-  and 
worker-initiated trainings, the predicted future employment period at a particular firm mainly affects 
participation in employer-initiated  training. Third, expected labor-market attachment and expected 
remaining tenure explain more than half of the difference between men and women in the probability of 
participating in employer-initiated training. In contrast, these proxy variables explain very little of the 
difference in training probabilities between regular and nonregular workers. These results suggest that a 
considerable part of the difference in job-training participation between men and women is the result of  
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differences in the length of the payoff period of investment, while differences in job-training participation 
between regular and nonregular workers arise largely because of the difference in skill requirements 
between the two groups. Fourth, firms in more competitive local labor markets are less likely to offer 
employer-initiated training to their workers, presumably in face of higher poaching risk. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and presents the 
heterogeneous  training-participation rate across workers'  attributes.  Section 3 estimates 
training-participation equations  to describe the determinants of the  training participation.  Section 4 
constructs  measures of labor-market attachment and expected length of job tenure by workers' 
characteristics  and examines  the extent to which  these measures can explain patterns of training 
participation by workers' characteristics. Section 5 explores the implication of local labor-market friction 
on training participation. Section 6 provides conclusions. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
The source of our data is microdata from the 2007 Employment Status Survey, which is a household 
survey of Japan that records job employer-initiated and worker-initiated training. Distinguishing between 
whether training was conducted at the employer’s initiative or that of the worker himself, it provides a 
breakdown of such training into the following categories: (a) training at the workplace (this category 
applies only to employer-provided training); (b) attending  college or graduate-school  courses; (c) 
attending courses at a special training school or other vocational school; (d) attending courses at a public 
occupational skills development facility; (e) attending  short courses  or seminars; (f) participating  in 
study-group meetings or workshops; (g) taking distance-learning courses; (h) self-learning (this category 
applies only to self-development), and (i) other. In this study, we refer to training initiated by the 
employer as “employer-initiated  training” and training initiated by the worker as “worker-initiated 
training.” 
We limit our sample to employed persons  aged 15-59  and exclude those enrolled in education. 
Moreover, we exclude company executives, the self-employed (with or without employees), family 
workers, and those doing piecework at home, because their work status is somewhat different in nature 
from the concept of an “employee” that we focus on here. Furthermore, we exclude observations for  
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individuals when we think there are recording errors.
3
Table  2  shows  the training-participation rate  by  workers’  attributes  for  employed  persons.  The 
job-training-participation rate for women is about 7 percentage points lower than that for men, and this 
difference is mainly caused by  differences in participation in employer-initiated  training. The 
training-participation rate for nonregular employees is lower than that for regular employees, with the 
difference being more pronounced for employer-initiated  training.  Both the employer-initiated 
training-participation rate and the worker-initiated training-participation rate increase with the level of 
education. The training-participation rate overall is highest for those in their 20s and early 30s, and then it 
gradually declines with age. The employer-initiated training-participation rate is highest, at 39.5 percent, 
for those in their early 20s and then declines, but it remains stable at over 30 percent for those in their 30s 
to early 50s, reflecting the fact that employed workers continuously receive employer-initiated training. 
On the other hand, worker-initiated training peaks at around 25 percent for those in their late 20s, then 
remains stable at around 20 percent for those in their 30s and 40s, and then declines again for those in 
their 50s.   
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the analysis 
sample. 
By industry, the  highest  participation rate  is  found  in  the  education  and  learning-support  sector; 
moreover,  employer-initiated  training is particularly widespread in finance and insurance,  as well as 
electricity, gas, heat supply, and water, while worker-initiated training is especially common in medical, 
health care, and welfare, as well as information and communications. By occupation, the overall ratio is 
high for specialist and technical occupations, as well as administrative and managerial occupations, with 
employer-initiated  training especially widespread in administrative and managerial occupations and 
worker-initiated training especially common in specialist and technical occupations. By size of employer, 
the larger the employer, the higher is the training-participation rate. Although this applies to both types of 
training, the pattern is particularly pronounced for employer-initiated training. The highest participation 
rates, though, are found for those working at government offices.   
Finally, contrary to our expectation that investment in job training would concentrate on those with a 
shorter tenure, we find that the participation rate increases with workers' job tenure, with a peak of about 
                                                 
3For example, cases in which the years of tenure are greater than 45, the age at which the present job was taken up is less 
than 15, etc.  
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50 percent for those with a tenure of 25-29 years. This conceivably reflects increased training for career 
development within firms, such as in management-training programs, as the different patterns for 
employer-initiated training and worker-initiated training indicate, with the latter being relatively stable at 
around 20 percent and showing comparatively little variation across tenure groups. Overall, patterns of 
training-participation rates  for the different aggregate categories by sex, age group, education, or 
employment status confirm once again that training-participation rates of women and nonregular workers 
are low. 
 
3. Estimation of the training-participation equation 
Next, we examine the probability that workers will engage in  any employer-  or worker-initiated 
training by the attributes, such as sex, age, education, and employment status, as well as such workplace 
attributes as industry, occupation, and employer size, affect training probabilities.   
Dependent variables of our probit estimation are whether a person received employer-initiated training 
and whether a person engaged in worker-initiated training. As explanatory variables, we include a female 
dummy, employment-status dummies, education dummies, and dummies for five-year age brackets, 
employer size, and tenure. Estimation results are presented in Table 3, with column (2) showing the 
results when the dummies control for industry (major classification, 16 industries), column (3) showing 
those when the dummies control for occupation (major classification, 10 occupations), and column (4) 
showing those when both sets of dummies are included.   
Starting by looking at the female dummy, in contrast with Table 2, here we find that the probability of 
receiving  employer-initiated training is actually higher for women, and this difference is statistically 
significant. For worker-initiated training, the coefficient is even larger and indicates that the probability of 
this kind of training is 3.5 percentage points higher for women than for men. For employer-initiated 
training,  however,  the coefficient becomes negative when the industry and occupation dummies are 
included. In particular, controlling for industry has a large impact on the coefficient. This indicates that 
women tend to work in industries where the probability of receiving training is high. In contrast, when it 
comes to worker-initiated  training, there are almost no differences between men and women  once 
industry and occupation are controlled for.     
Turning to employment status, we find that the participation probabilities for nonregular workers are 
lower than those for regular workers, and the difference is larger for employer-initiated training than for  
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worker-initiated training. For example, the probability of receiving employer-initiated training is roughly 
20 percentage points lower for part-time and casual workers and dispatched workers than for regular 
employees. For contract employees, the gap vis-à-vis regular employees is roughly half the size of that of 
part-time and casual workers.   
Next, looking at the role of education, we find that even when we hold other factors constant, the 
training probabilities of the highly educated are very high,  with regard to both  employer-  and 
worker-initiated training. This is a phenomenon already well documented in previous research on Japan, 
the United States, the UK, Germany, and other countries (Kurosawa (2001), Kawaguchi (2006), Altonji 
and Spletzer (1991), Green (1993), Pischke (2001)). As highlighted by Altonji and Spletzer (1991), this 
can be interpreted as evidence that those with greater learning abilities acquire more years of education 
and are more likely to participate in job training. When industry and occupation dummies are included, 
however, that difference becomes considerably smaller. This means that more highly educated workers 
are more likely to work in industries and occupations where the training probability is high. Moreover, 
differences by educational attainment are larger for worker-initiated than employer-initiated training. As 
for the role of age, although the probability of employer-initiated training decreases with age from the late 
20s onward, for worker-initiated training, no significant differences can be observed until the early 40s.     
Turning to the role of employer size, the results indicate that the larger the employer, the higher is the 
probability of training participation. The probability of receiving employer-initiated training is about 30 
percentage points higher for workers at firms with more than 1,000 employees or at government offices 
than for workers at firms with fewer than 10 employees. With regard to worker-initiated training, however, 
differences by employer size are quite small. Next, looking at tenure, the probability of employer-initiated 
training increases with tenure and reaches a peak in the neighborhood of 30-39 years. This is a finding 
that differs from our theoretical expectation and implies that workers receive continuous 
employer-initiated training as part of a process of career development with length of service. This pattern 
can also be found in the estimation that includes  the occupation dummies and hence a dummy for 
administrative and managerial occupations suggests that this employer-initiated  training for career 
development continues to takes place across occupations.
4
                                                 
4  Pischke (2001) arrives at a similar finding regarding this kind of continuous training, showing that in Germany training 
remains high for workers into their 40s. 
  In contrast, the longer workers’ tenure, the 
less likely they are to engage in worker-initiated training.  
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Summarizing these findings, we can say that among those who are employed, the probabilities of 
training participation for women, less-educated workers, and nonregular workers are still lower when 
controlling for age, employer size, tenure, industry, and occupation. The differences are particularly large 
when it comes to employer-initiated training. For worker-initiated training, however, there is almost no 
difference between the sexes, while differences by age or size of employer are also small. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the probability of receiving employer-initiated training is noticeably smaller for 
women, those at small firms, and nonregular employees, though it seems that women and those employed 
at small firms compensate for this by pursuing worker-initiated training. In contrast, the difference 
between the less educated and the better educated is even greater for worker-initiated training than for 
employer-initiated training.   
 
4. Relations among labor-market attachment, remaining tenure, and job training 
4.1 Theoretical framework and empirical methodology 
Human-capital models claim that the amount of investment in general human capital at a particular 
point in time is determined by the marginal rate of return on investment and marginal cost. The marginal 
rate of return on investment is determined by the length of the payoff period, the future price of human 
capital, and workers’ learning ability. In contrast, marginal cost of investment is determined by the direct 
cost of investment and the opportunity cost of training, that is, the current wage rate.     
When human capital is firm-specific as a result of technological factors or market friction, there is a 
divergence between workers’ outside  option (the wage rate in the labor market) and their marginal 
productivity, because they cannot sell those skills to other firms. Depending on the firm’s bargaining 
power, the firm reaps part of this divergence as rent and the discounted present value of that rent 
determines the amount of human-capital investment financed by the firm. The discounted present value of 
that rent depends on workers’ remaining employment period and is closely related to the difficulty with 
which workers can switch jobs (i.e., the degree of market friction), the future value of goods made with 
firm-specific human capital, and workers’ learning ability.      
The purpose here is to examine to what extent we can explain differences in training probabilities 
across  workers' attributes  found in the preceding section with differences in workers’ remaining 
employment period. Differences in training probabilities between men and women and across workers 
with different employment statuses are often explained with differences in expected employment periods  
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in the labor market and/or lengths of employment at a specific firm. Royalty (1996), as mentioned above, 
using the NLSY panel dataset of the United States, examined the effect of turnover probabilities on 
receiving job training. Specifically, she estimated turnover probabilities, that is, the probability of staying 
in the current job,  job-to-job turnover, and job-to-nonemployment turnover, and then  compared  the 
estimated
5  training probabilities when job-turnover probabilities are included and when they are not. 
Royalty found that the probability of receiving employer-initiated training is higher for men, but when 
turnover probabilities are included, the difference in the probability between men and women declined by 
25 percent.
6
The approach we take in this study is to examine whether differences in the length of future 
employment and differences in predicted years of tenure with a specific firm can explain training 
probabilities. Specifically, we examine whether differences in the length of future employment (expected 
labor-market attachment) affect the probabilities of both employer- and worker-initiated training. At the 
same time, we examine  the effect of  the  remaining employment period  at the same firm (expected 
remaining tenure) on the probability mainly of employer-initiated training. In addition, we examine to 
what extent taking these factors into account changes the gap in training probabilities of female and 
nonregular workers vis-à-vis their reference groups.   
  She also showed that the probability of receiving employer-initiated training for the highly 
educated is no longer significantly higher when turnover probabilities are taken into account.   
 
4.1.1 The attachment index (AI) 
The more workers are attached to the labor market, the higher is their incentive to participate in 
training and raise their job skills, holding other variables  constant.  The degrees of labor-market 
attachment are presumably different by workers' characteristics such as age, sex,  or educational 
background. To gauge this labor-market attachment, we calculated the total amount of time each worker 
can be expected to spend in the labor market under the assumption that the worker behaves as the average 
person within the demographic group to which he/she belongs. 
Specifically, the attachment index is calculated as: 
                                                 
5  Setting those receiving no training as the reference group, she conducted multinomial probit regressions between 
training conducted by the employer and off-the-job training (vocational training school, business school, courses, etc.).   
6  i.e., the coefficient for the male dummy declined from 0.011 to 0.008.  
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AI(age,sex,education) = � hourst ���������(sex,education)
59
t=age
2000 �  
where  hourst ���������(sex,education)  is the average hours worked
7
This index is an indicator showing how many full-time years a worker of a given sex and with a given 
education will work in the period that remains from his or her age until age 59. It should be noted that we 
implicitly assume a stationary economic environment, because we take the average employment patterns 
in the Employment Status Survey for the observations and assume that the cross-sectional observations 
represent observations of the employment patterns for individuals over time. This is a strong assumption, 
but it is a standard one made, for example, in estimations of Mincerian  wage  equations  using 
cross-sectional data.   
  by workers of t years old, defined by 
workers’  sex and educational backgrounds.  The summed hours worked  until 59 years old, general 
retirement age is divided by 2000, which is the typical number of annual hours worked by a full-time 
worker. This AI index attempts to capture the total strength of labor-market attachment before retirement 
age;  thus the sample  now includes those out of the  labor force and  employed  persons  who are in 
education, company executives, the self-employed (with or without employees), family workers, and 
those doing piecework at home. The sample of 15-59 year olds (sample A) is divided into 442 groups 
according to their attributes (age, sex, education). Next, we divide the sample of employed persons used 
in the estimation in Section 3 (sample B) into groups according to the same attributes (age, sex, 
education) (415 groups). We then apply the AI of a particular group in sample A to each of the same 415 
groups in sample B.   
 
4.1.2 Remaining tenure (RT) 
In the case that a skill acquired through job training is not perfectly valued in the market, firms will 
have an incentive to invest in workers, because workers will not change their job even if the firm does not 
offer a wage increase commensurate with the increase in skill, thus allowing the firm to reap the return to 
investment. Consequently, how long a worker with given attributes is expected to continue working for 
the present employer is likely to be an important determinant of employer-initiated training. Therefore, as 
our second measure, we calculate the expected remaining tenure (RT) for each attribute, which gauges how 
                                                 
7We apply zero in the case of those not employed.  
11 
 
long a worker with given attributes can be expected to continue working for the present employer.  
To calculate the expected remaining tenure period of a worker with certain demographic characteristics, 
we calculate the following index: 
RT(sex,education,employment status,industry,size of employer,directly hired from schools)
= tenure ���������(sex, education, employment status, industry,
size of employer, directly hired from schools) − tenure 
based on the sample of employed persons from Sections 2 and 3 (labeled sample B). There are 6,151 
groups according to workers’ attributes (sex, education, employment status, industry, size of employer, 
and  directly hired from schools  [whether workers entered a firm directly upon graduation]).
8
The variable "directly hired from schools" indicates whether the worker took up the current 
employment right after his/her school graduation. The reason that we distinguish whether workers took up 
their current employment directly upon graduation is that, in the Japanese labor market, there is a strong 
tendency for fresh graduate recruits to follow a career path through promotion within the firm, while 
mid-career recruits represent a much more fluid working force and can be expected to subsequently 
follow a career through job changes. Here, we mechanically regard as having started their present job as 
fresh graduate recruits those for whom the age at which they took up the job (current age minus years of 
tenure) was 15-16 years in the case of junior-high-school graduates;  18-19 years in  the case of 
high-school graduates; 20-21 years in the case of graduates of vocational schools, junior colleges, or 
technical colleges; and 22-25 in the case of graduates of colleges and graduate schools. 
  The 
variable  tenure ���������  is the median years of job tenure for each demographic group. Because the number of 
observations may be very small for some groups, we employ the median to avoid any distortion from 
outliers. We subtract the actual years of tenure from the median value of years of tenure for each group 
and set this as remaining tenure (RT). If the value thus obtained is negative, we set RT to zero. Moreover, 
we create a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the value obtained is negative to represent strong attachment 
to a firm that is unascertainable from workers’ observable attributes.   
Figure 1 shows the distribution, average, and median for the RT of 30-year-old male regular employees 
who graduated from college or graduate school, with the upper panel for fresh graduate recruits and the 
                                                 
8We do not consider occupation as a workers’ attribute because workers’ occupation can change with age, such as when 
they move into administrative and managerial occupations.  
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lower panel for mid-career recruits. Whereas the RT of graduate recruits is around 12 years, that for 
mid-career recruits, even though they otherwise have the same attributes in terms of sex, education, and 
employment status, is strikingly lower at around 2 years. Based on this result, we expect that those 
recruited upon graduation are in jobs in which they will continue to work for a long time and the 
probability that they will receive employer-initiated training is consequently high.   
 
4.2 AI, RT, and training probabilities 
We now attempt to explain the difference in training-participation probabilities across demographic 
groups by the difference in the expected length of labor-market attachment or tenure at a specific firm. In 
particular, we examine whether the lower rate of training participation by female and nonregular workers 
can be explained by the shorter length of expected length of labor-market attachment or tenure at a 
specific firm. Table 4 tabulates the means and standard deviation of the Attachment Index (AI) and 
Remaining Tenure (RT) by demographic characteristics and employment status. Here Table 4 focuses 
only on statistics of the RT with 0 and over. The figures indicate that female workers tend to have both 
lower average AI and RT. All types of nonregular workers have a shorter expected length of RT than 
regular workers. 
We start by looking at the effects of AI and RT on the probabilities of training participation by types of 
trainings. To identify the relations, the following probit models are estimated: 
Pr(Trainingi = 1|AIi,RTi) = Φ�β0 + AIiβ1 + RTiβ2�, 
where “Trainingi” is a dummy variable indicating whether person i received employer- or worker-initiated 
training, and AIi and RTi are sets of dummy variables that correspond to the years of AI or RT of person i. 
Results are presented in Figures 2 and 3, which on the horizontal axis show the values of the dummy 
variables  and on the  vertical axis indicate  the size of the marginal effect estimated  from the probit 
estimation. As can be seen, for AI, the higher the index (i.e., the greater the predicted future labor-market 
attachment), the higher is the training probability. There are no great differences in the shapes of the 
curves for employer- and worker-initiated training. For RT, we also find that the higher the value, the 
higher is the training probability, but there is a considerable difference in the shapes of the curves for the 
two types of training. That is, whereas the probability of employer-initiated training displays a steep 
increase, the probability of worker-initiated moves sideways until 8 years of RT, and after that it rises 
relatively slowly. This result shows that whereas a greater length of future employment, as represented by  
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AI, is associated with an increase in job training at the initiative of both workers and firms, a greater 
length of predicted employment at a specific firm, represented by RT, is associated mainly with an 
increase in job training at the firms’ initiative. These results are consistent with human-capital theory, 
under the assumption that firms do not fully compensate workers for their skill upgrading induced by 
training participation because of skill specificity or labor-market friction, and thus firms have an incentive 
to invest in workers to reap the return to investment.   
The preceding results show that the length of the expected payoff period for investment in human 
capital affects participation in job training. Now, we attempt to quantify how much these two indices can 
explain the difference in the probability of training participation between male and female workers or 
between regular and nonregular workers found in Section 3. If short expected-investment payoff periods 
explain why the job-training probabilities of female and nonregular workers are low, then we would 
expect that by controlling for the AI and RT variables, the gap vis-à-vis the reference groups should 
shrink.   
Table 5 shows the estimation result for the probabilities of employer- and worker-initiated training 
using sex, employment status, and education as explanatory variables. Moreover, we also include the 
industry, employer size, and fresh-graduate-recruit dummies used for constructing  groups in the 
calculation of RT. This is to take into account the possibility that these factors directly affect workers’ 
job-training probability through technological aspects of production activities and worker heterogeneity. 
The results in columns (1) and (3) do not include AI and RT, while those in columns (2) and (4) do.       
Comparing the results for employer-initiated  training, we find that in column (1) the difference 
between men and women is 3.5 percentage points, but by controlling for AI and RT in column (2), the 
difference shrinks to 1.4 percentage points. That is, more than half of the difference between men and 
women in the probability of receiving employer-initiated training can be explained by the two factors of 
how much longer someone will continue to be employed in the labor market (AI) and how much longer 
he or she will continue to work for the present employer (RT). In contrast, only about one fifth of the low 
training probability for the less educated can be explained by these factors. This suggests that while the 
length of the investment-payoff period explains some of the difference in training probabilities by level of 
educational attainment, a large part of the difference is caused by differences in the returns from job 
training (that is, differences in learning efficiency) and differences in the discount rate for future earnings. 
Finally, for nonregular workers, the differences do not diminish even when AI and RT are included.    
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In sum, our results indicate that differences in labor-market attachment and expected remaining tenure 
at the present employer affect training probabilities in a way that is consistent with the predictions of 
human-capital theory. Moreover, the results show that these factors partly explain the low probabilities of 
training participation for women and the less educated. Concerning the low probability of training 
participation among nonregular workers, however, other factors are more important. Although we do not 
clearly know the reasons for the difference in training probabilities between  regular and nonregular 
workers, we speculate that a large part of the difference in training probabilities between regular and 
nonregular workers is caused  by  differences in the type of work they do and the resulting skill 
requirements. 
 
5. Competition in local labor markets and training participation 
The analysis in the previous section finds that an index for “remaining tenure” to a specific firm 
explains participation in employer-initiated training. This relation could emerge when part of the return to 
training is captured by the firm that offers training opportunities to its workers. A firm can capture a part 
of the return when participants' outside option does not increase because of firm specificity of the 
accumulated skill or friction in a local labor market. This section further explores the implication of local 
labor-market friction on participation to employer-initiated  training.  Specifically, we first examine 
whether  local labor-market friction, measured by proxy variables, increases the probability of 
participating in employer-initiated training. Second, we examine whether the relation between “remaining 
tenure” and participation in employer-initiated training is stronger in a market with a higher degree of 
local labor-market friction. 
The friction of the local labor market is measured by two indexes defined at prefecture level. The first 
index is the number of employees per square kilometer, defined as  D1. This index captures the ease with 
which a worker can find another potential employer, as adopted by previous literature (Brunello and 
Gambarotto (2007) and Brunello and De Paola(2008)). The second index is industry specialization, i.e., a 
share of the number of workers in a specific industry among all workers in a prefecture. More specifically, 
the index for a worker in industry k in prefecture j is defined as  D2 =
Ekj
∑ Ekj k
  . This index captures the ease 
with which a worker can find another employer in the same industry as the current employer. As shown in 
the previous literature (Neal (1995)), part of the human capital formed on the job, including the one  
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accrued through training participation, could well be industry-specific.  If part of human capital is 
industry-specific, a worker in an industry agglomeration is more likely to find another employer who 
appreciates her skill. In fear of workers being poached, an employer in an industry agglomeration may 
offer less employer-initiated training opportunities to its workers. The higher both D1  and  D2s are, the 
more competitive the  local labor market should be,  with  a  higher probability that a worker will be 
poached by another firm. 
In addition to the degree of local labor-market friction, several other local labor-market conditions 
may affect the probability of training participation. Workers’ higher skill level in a region enhances the 
efficiency of human-capital accumulation (Moretti (2004)). Part of this efficiency-enhancement effect is 
capitalized to local land price and local wage (Roback (1982)). If the efficiency enhancement effect is not 
fully offset by an increase in the opportunity costs of training, however, the higher average skill of 
regional workers increases the probability of training participation. To capture this local spillover effect of 
human capital, prefectural-level average years of education or fraction of college-educated workers is 
included in the specification.     
To examine the effects of local labor-market characteristics on the probability of training participation 
by worker i in prefecture j, the following probit model is estimated: 
Pr�Trainingij = 1�z,xi� = Φ�γ0 + γ1z1j + γ2z2ij + γ3z3j + xiβ�, 
where  z1j  is the number of workers per 1,000 square kilometer in prefecture j,
9  z2ij  is the share of 
workers in the industry that worker i works for in prefecture j, and z3j  is the average years of education 
or fraction of college-educated workers in prefecture j. Vector   xi  includes individual characteristics of 
worker i that are: female dummy, employment-type dummies, age dummies, industry dummies, 
occupation dummies, employer size dummies, and dummies for years of job tenure. To capture poaching 
effects  related to industry-specific skill more clearly, we disaggregate “manufacturing” into 7  more 
specific subcategories
10
Table  6  reports the results of regressions. Column 1 indicates  that  a  higher density of workers, 
measured by the number of workers per 1,000 square kilometer and the fraction of workers in the same 
industry,  suppresses  the probability of participating in  employer-initiated  training.  The size of the 
  in obtaining z2ij. 
                                                 
9  Area data in each prefecture are obtained from the Population Census in 2005. 
10  (a) food, beverage, tobacco and feed; (b) textile, apparel, and leather products; (c) wood products, furniture, pulp, 
paper products, and printing; (d) chemicals; (e) metals; (f) machinery; and (g) others.  
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coefficients  is  unaffected by the inclusion of the  regional average of human capital,  as reported in 
Columns 2 and 3. These findings are consistent with the notion that less competition in the local labor 
market encourages employers to provide training opportunities. Higher local average human capital also 
increases the probability of participating in employer-initiated training. 
In contrast, Table 6 Column 4 shows that the higher density of workers per square kilometer increases 
the probability of participating in worker-initiated training, while a higher share of workers in the current 
employer's industry decreases it. Even when including prefecture-level average years of education or a 
fraction of college graduates, the local density does not  significantly  suppress  the probability of 
participating in worker-initiated training, but the share of workers in the industry of the current employer 
decreases it. Less friction in the local labor market, represented by a higher density of workers, does not 
discourage worker-initiated training, but lower local specialization in the industry of the current employer, 
meaning  a  differentiated local labor market,  encourages  worker-initiated training.  These results are 
sensible if higher possibilities for workers to transit to another industry encourage workers to be more 
involved in worker-initiated training and to accumulate skills not necessarily specific to the industry in 
which workers are employed. In addition, the magnitude of local spillover effects of regional education, 
measured by average years of education or the ratio of college graduates, on worker-initiated training are 
estimated to be substantially large.   
As we find in the preceding section, the higher the  AI  or  RT, the higher is the probability of 
employer-initiated training. Then we examine how this relation differs by the degree of local labor-market 
friction. We divide the sample into two areas. The area is defined as dense if the ratio of workers in the 
same industry each worker faces,  D2 =
Ekj
∑ Ekj k
, is the median value of the whole sample or more. The area 
is defined as sparse if otherwise. Figures 4 and 5 compare the relation between AI and RT across dense 
and sparse areas. Both figures indicate that the probability of training in the sparse area, i.e., the area of a 
less competitive local labor market, has a steeper slope, implying that the positive relation between AI or 
RT and employer-initiated training is stronger in areas where the local labor market is supposed to be 
more frictional. The effects of RT on employer-initiated training are especially different between dense 
and sparse areas. Overall, results for employer- and worker-initiated training and the difference of the 
results for two types of training activities do not refute the hypothesis that employers operating in a local 
labor market with high friction are more likely to offer employer-initiated  training to their  workers  
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because they can reap part of the return to workers’ skill accumulation. 
   
6. Conclusion 
Using microdata from the 2007  Employment Status Survey, this study empirically examined 
determinants of workers’ participation in employer- and worker-initiated training. By calculating each 
worker’s expected labor-market attachment – that is, how much time that worker will spend in the labor 
market until retirement – and each worker’s remaining tenure – that is, how many years each worker with 
given attributes will continue to work for his/her present employer – we examined the relation of these 
variables with training participation. We particularly focused on the low participation probabilities for 
women,  the less educated, and non-regular workers,  and examined  the extent to which expected 
labor-market attachment and remaining tenure explain these workers’ low training probabilities.   
Our main findings were as follows. First, controlling for age, employer size, years of tenure, industry, 
and occupation, we found that training probabilities for women, the less educated, and non-regular 
workers were lower than for the relevant reference groups. The differences were particularly large for 
employer-initiated training. In contrast, for worker-initiated training, there was almost no difference by 
sex, and the differences by age and by employer size were also small. This pattern could be interpreted as 
suggesting that women and workers at small firms try to make up for receiving less employer-initiated 
training by participating in worker-initiated training. Differences between the less educated and the better 
educated were even greater for worker-initiated training than for employer-initiated training, however. A 
likely explanation for this is that learning ability and discount rates for future earnings differ across those 
with different levels of educational attainment. Second, we estimated how training participation depends 
on workers’ attachment to the labor market, represented by the attachment index (AI), and how long a 
worker can be expected to continue working for his current employer, represented by remaining tenure 
(RT). The results indicated that the higher the AI  (i.e., the greater the predicted future labor-market 
attachment), the higher are the training probabilities. In addition, there were no substantial differences in 
the shapes of the curves for employer- and worker-initiated training. We also found that the higher the 
value of RT, the higher the training is likely to be, but the slope of the curve showing the effect of RT was 
much greater for employer-initiated training than for worker-initiated training. This shows that whereas 
greater length of future employment increases job-training participation at the initiative of both workers 
and employers, differences in the predicted years of employment at a specific firm raise job-training  
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participation mainly at the firm’s initiative. Moreover, these results suggest that there is firm-specificity in 
the formation of skills through employer-initiated training because of technology-related factors and/or 
market friction.     
Third, women’s lower participation rate in employer-initiated training is largely explained by AI and 
RT in the estimation. In  contrast, for non-regular workers, the negative coefficient remains largely 
unchanged even when controlling for AI and RT. These results imply that the difference in training 
participation between men and women is  explained by the difference in their  future prospects  of 
labor-market attachments, while the difference between regular and non-regular workers is not explained 
by this factor. Although it is now only a conjecture, a likely reason seems to be that nonregular workers 
are only assigned tasks that require little training to begin with. More in-depth research on the causes of 
disparities in job training between regular and nonregular workers is necessary to reach a definitive 
conclusion. 
Fourth,  workers in more  competitive local labor markets  are less likely to participate  in 
employer-initiated training, conceivably because of higher poaching risk. This fact is consistent with the 
notion that part of human capital formed by firm-initiated training is firm-specific and that firms can reap 
the return to their  human-capital investment.  Higher average human capital in a region is found to 
encourage the workers' participation in both employer-initiated training and especially worker-initiated 
training. This evidence is consistent with human-capital spillover. 
Overall, the results obtained in this paper are consistent with the prediction from the standard 
human-capital theory that the investment-planning horizon plays a crucial role in investment decisions. 
Moreover, firms' expectations about whether they can reap the returns to human-capital investment are 
shown to be a crucial determinant for firm-initiated training. This result is consistent with predictions 
from a strand of literature on who finances on-the-job training (Hashimoto (1981), Stevens (1994), Chang 
and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)).   
The results obtained in this paper imply that institutional practices that enable women to stay in the 
labor market or specific firm for longer period, such as work-life balance policy, would at the same time 
enhance women’s training participation. Government policies that encourage firms to adopt such practices 
may well contribute to narrowing the gap of human-capital formation between men and women and 
consequently contribute to narrowing the gender wage gap. In contrast to the clear implication for women, 
results in this paper do not illustrate the reasons behind the  low  training-participation rate among  
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nonregular workers. The possible reasons for lower participation may be rigid labor-market institutions 
that prevent a transition from nonregular to regular jobs.  Nonregular workers  may conceivably be 
confined to dead-end jobs without a chance to upgrade their job career, resulting in a lower return to 
human-capital investment. Shedding more light on the reasons for the lower training-participation rate 
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    Mean  Std. Dev. 
Female  0.464    0.499   
Regular employees  0.697    0.460   
Part-time and casual workers    0.209    0.407   
Dispatched workers from temporary labor agencies  0.027    0.162   
Contract employees  0.050    0.217   
Primary or junior-high school (reference)  0.070    0.255   
Senior-high school  0.468    0.499   
Vocational school, junior college  0.228    0.419   
College, graduate school  0.222    0.416   
Age  40.8    11.242   
15 to 19  0.010    0.099   
20 to 24  0.078    0.269   
25 to 29  0.111    0.314   
30 to 34  0.130    0.336   
35 to 39  0.133    0.339   
40 to 44  0.127    0.333   
45 to 49  0.133    0.339   
50 to 54  0.133    0.340   
55 to 59  0.145    0.352   
Firm Size : 1 to 9 persons  0.138    0.345   
10 to 29  0.136    0.343   
30 to 99  0.159    0.366   
100 to 299  0.136    0.343   
300 to 499  0.056    0.230   
500 to 999  0.061    0.240   
1,000 and over  0.189    0.391   
Government  0.118    0.322   
Tenure  11.47    10.677   
0 to 4 years  0.382    0.486   
5 to 9  0.169    0.374   
10 to 14  0.120    0.325   
15 to19  0.108    0.310   
20 to 24  0.069    0.253   
25 to 29  0.062    0.241   
30 to 34  0.050    0.218   
35 to 39  0.033    0.177   
40 and over  0.008    0.089   
New graduates dummies  0.235    0.424   
AI  11.73    8.409   
RT  -1.73    8.353   
Number of employees per 1,000 square kilometer  0.281    0.466   
Industry specialization  0.089  0.054   
Average years of education    13.262    0.344   
Ratio of college graduates    0.195    0.054   23 
 
Table 2: Job-training participation by workers’ characteristics (%) 
   




   
Worker-initiated 
training 
Total  41.7  33.6  20.1 
Sex       
Male  44.8  37.1  20.2 
Female  37.7  29.3  19.9 
Employment status       
Regular employees  47.9  40.3  22.5 
Part-time and casual workers  22.5  15.1  11.5 
Dispatched workers from temporary labor 
agencies 
29.6  16.9  17.9 
Contract employees  40.6  29.1  21.7 
Education       
Primary or junior high school  17.9  14.9  5.5 
Senior high school  32.1  26.8  11.8 
Vocational school, junior college  45.4  36.0  23.2 
College, graduate school  59.3  47.0  33.9 
Age       
Average  38.5  38.7  37.9 
15 to 19  36.7  32.0  11.3 
20 to 24  48.2  39.5  23.1 
25 to 29  47.2  36.7  25.4 
30 to 34  43.9  34.2  22.7 
35 to 39  41.5  32.7  20.4 
40 to 44  41.8  33.9  20.2 
45 to 49  42.2  35.0  19.8 
50 to 54  38.2  32.0  16.6 
55 to 59  32.1  26.9  13.2 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries  21.7  13.7  11.8 
Mining, construction  35.2  27.8  15.2 
Manufacturing  34.4  28.6  13.3 
Electricity, gas, heat supply, and water  63.6  55.5  28.3 
Information and communications  52.4  38.7  30.9 
Transport  28.5  23.9  9.9 
Wholesale and retail trade  33.1  26.5  13.9 
Finance and insurance  62.9  55.8  27.8 
Real estate  44.1  31.2  25.7 
Eating and drinking places, 
accommodations 
23.6  15.4  12.4 
Medical, health care, and welfare  59.1  49.2  33.2 
Education, learning support  69.3  56.6  43.6 
Compound services  58.9  54.2  20.5 
Services not elsewhere classified  40.3  30.2  20.9 
Government not elsewhere classified  58.3  49.7  27.5 
       24 
 
(continued)       
   





  Worker-initiated 
training 
 
Occupation       
Specialist and technical workers  66.3  54.2  40.6 
Administrative and managerial workers  65.8  60.0  27.6 
Clerical workers  42.8  33.1  21.3 
Sales workers  41.0  34.3  16.8 
Service workers  37.8  29.0  18.8 
Security workers  57.8  49.5  25.0 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery workers  24.5  15.8  13.4 
Transport and communication workers  25.9  22.2  7.9 
Production process and related workers  28.9  23.9  10.2 
Size of employer (number of employees)       
1 to 9 persons  25.2  15.3  14.6 
10 to 29  29.4  21.3  14.7 
30 to 99  33.9  25.9  16.1 
100 to 299  40.4  32.9  18.4 
300 to 499  44.7  36.7  20.3 
500 to 999  47.2  39.7  21.1 
1,000 and over  51.1  43.9  22.6 
Government  64.3  55.9  34.9 
Tenure       
Average  11.5  12.3  10.5 
0 to 4 years  38.7  28.6  20.7 
5 to 9  39.5  31.9  19.2 
10 to 14  41.2  34.4  18.7 
15 to19  44.8  38.1  19.8 
20 to 24  48.8  42.5  22.0 
25 to 29  50.9  45.5  21.9 
30 to 34  49.5  44.0  20.6 
35 to 39  44.1  39.5  16.0 
40 and over  35.1  31.1  10.8 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the 2007 Employment Status Survey, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications.    25 
 
Table 3: Probit analysis of job-training probabilities 
 
  Employer-initiated training  Worker-initiated training 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Female  0.024  -0.036  -0.014  -0.037  0.035  0.000  0.000  -0.009 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Part-time and 
casual workers 
-0.193  -0.171  -0.185  -0.168  -0.075  -0.062  -0.064  -0.056 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Dispatched 
workers   
-0.199  -0.171  -0.176  -0.163  -0.044  -0.020  -0.018  -0.012 
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Contract 
employees 
-0.102  -0.100  -0.096  -0.096  -0.016  -0.017  -0.010  -0.012 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Senior-high 
school    0.081  0.070  0.064  0.065  0.074  0.067  0.059  0.059 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Vocational school, 
junior college 
0.195  0.133  0.130  0.115  0.199  0.150  0.133  0.124 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
College, graduate 
school 
0.213  0.160  0.135  0.132  0.288  0.242  0.207  0.201 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Age: 20 to 24  -0.018  -0.031  -0.018  -0.030  0.023  0.016  0.022  0.016 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age: 25 to 29  -0.067  -0.078  -0.065  -0.077  0.025  0.019  0.025  0.019 
(0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age: 30 to 34    -0.090  -0.101  -0.087  -0.099  0.025  0.020  0.025  0.020 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age: 35 to 39    -0.099  -0.113  -0.098  -0.111  0.020  0.013  0.019  0.013 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Age: 40 to 44    -0.092  -0.110  -0.093  -0.109  0.021  0.011  0.019  0.011 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Age: 45 to 49    -0.093  -0.115  -0.092  -0.112  0.012  0.001  0.012  0.002 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age: 50 to 54    -0.117  -0.136  -0.114  -0.133  -0.007  -0.017  -0.004  -0.013 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age: 55 to 59    -0.141  -0.158  -0.138  -0.156  -0.021  -0.030  -0.018  -0.026 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Size: 10 to 29 
0.090  0.084  0.085  0.082  -0.003  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Size: 30 to 99 
0.140  0.136  0.135  0.134  0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Size: 100 to 299 
0.201  0.200  0.195  0.198  0.009  0.008  0.004  0.006 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Size: 300 to 499 
0.243  0.244  0.238  0.241  0.023  0.026  0.018  0.023 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Size: 500 to 999 
0.258  0.266  0.255  0.262  0.026  0.035  0.022  0.030 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Size: 1,000 and 
over 
0.300  0.314  0.304  0.309  0.043  0.060  0.046  0.054 
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Size: Government 
0.362  0.287  0.316  0.278  0.118  0.047  0.065  0.037 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 26 
 
(Continued) 
    Employer-initiated training  Worker-initiated training 
(Self-development) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Tenure: 5 to 9 
0.020  0.022  0.020  0.021  -0.024  -0.023  -0.025  -0.024 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Tenure: 10 to 14 
0.029  0.036  0.032  0.035  -0.032  -0.028  -0.031  -0.029 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Tenure: 15 to 19 
0.042  0.055  0.042  0.052  -0.028  -0.021  -0.030  -0.025 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Tenure: 20 to 24 
0.070  0.081  0.066  0.076  -0.017  -0.011  -0.023  -0.018 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tenure: 25 to 29 
0.093  0.100  0.086  0.094  -0.010  -0.007  -0.019  -0.015 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tenure: 30 to 34 
0.099  0.105  0.089  0.096  -0.005  -0.002  -0.016  -0.012 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tenure: 35 to 39 
0.098  0.108  0.085  0.098  0.002  0.007  -0.010  -0.005 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Tenure: 40 and over 
0.084  0.092  0.071  0.083  0.006  0.010  -0.005  -0.001 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Industry dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Occupation dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468 
Pseudo R2  0.109  0.135  0.125  0.140  0.080  0.103  0.104  0.111 
Notes: Marginal effects at the means of the independent variables are reported. Standard errors robust to 
misspecification are reported in parentheses. 27 
 
Table 4: Means and standard deviation of AI and RT by demographic characteristics   
    Attachment index  Remaining tenure 
0 and over 
    Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Male  14.923  9.344  5.101  4.442 
Female  8.054  5.125  3.186  3.131 
Regular employees  12.744  8.549  5.185  4.283 
Part-time and casual workers  8.307  6.928  2.010  1.465 
Dispatched workers from temporary labor agencies  13.784  7.789  0.940  0.894 
Contract workers  11.387  8.469  1.866  1.982 
Primary or junior-high school  7.893  8.096  5.056  5.132 
Senior high school  11.109  8.501  4.604  4.157 
Vocational school, junior college  12.196  7.856  3.286  3.072 
College, graduate school  13.934  8.251  4.089  3.900 
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Table 5: The Attachment Index (AI), Remaining Tenure (RT), and training probabilities 





  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Female  -0.035  -0.014  0.001  0.006 
(0.002)  (0.002)  -0.002  (0.002) 
Part-time and casual workers  -0.186  -0.185  -0.060  -0.058 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Dispatched workers from temporary labor agencies    -0.174  -0.180  -0.005  -0.007 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Contract employees  -0.108  -0.111  -0.011  -0.011 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Senior-high school  0.074  0.060  0.074  0.068 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Vocational school, junior college    0.141  0.117  0.166  0.154 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
College, graduate school  0.154  0.128  0.257  0.245 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
AI  No  Yes  No  Yes 
RT  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468 
Pseudo R2  0.133  0.135  0.100  0.103 
Note: Marginal effects at the means of the independent variables are reported. Standard errors robust to 
misspecification are reported in parentheses. Industry, size of employer, and new graduate dummies are 
also included in each estimation. 
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Table 6: Probit analysis of job-training probabilities by regional characteristics   
    Employer-initiated training  Worker-initiated training 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Number of employees per 
1,000 square kilometer 
-0.021  -0.026  -0.025  0.014  -0.002  -0.002 
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Industry specialization  -0.139    -0.133    -0.134    -0.122    -0.098    -0.097   
(0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Average years of education        0.009      0.030   
    (0.003)      (0.003)   
Ratio of college graduates          0.045      0.191 
      (0.023)      (0.017) 
Female  -0.035    -0.035  -0.035  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Part-time and casual workers  -0.167    -0.167    -0.167    -0.057    -0.057    -0.057   
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Dispatched workers from 
temporary labor agencies   
-0.165    -0.166    -0.166    -0.013    -0.014    -0.014   
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Contract employees  -0.097    -0.096    -0.097    -0.012    -0.011    -0.011   
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Senior-high school  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.059  0.058  0.059 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Vocational school, junior 
college 
0.114  0.114  0.114  0.123  0.121  0.121 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
College, graduate school  0.134  0.133  0.133  0.198  0.194  0.194 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Age: 20 to 24  -0.030  -0.030  -0.030  0.016  0.016  0.016 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age: 25 to 29  -0.076  -0.076  -0.076  0.019  0.019  0.019 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age: 30 to 34    -0.098  -0.099  -0.099  0.020  0.019  0.019 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age: 35 to 39    -0.110  -0.110  -0.110  0.012  0.012  0.012 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age: 40 to 44    -0.108  -0.108  -0.108  0.010  0.010  0.010 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age: 45 to 49    -0.112  -0.112  -0.112  0.002  0.002  0.002 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age: 50 to 54    -0.132  -0.132  -0.132  -0.013  -0.014  -0.013 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age: 55 to 59    -0.154  -0.154  -0.154  -0.026  -0.027  -0.027 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             30 
 
(continued)             
    Employer-provided training  Self-development 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Tenure: 5 to 9 
0.021    0.021    0.021    -0.024    -0.024    -0.024   
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Tenure: 10 to 14 
0.035    0.035    0.035    -0.029    -0.029    -0.029   
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Tenure: 15 to 19 
0.052    0.052    0.052    -0.025    -0.025    -0.025   
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Tenure: 20 to 24 
0.075    0.075    0.075    -0.018    -0.018    -0.018   
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tenure: 25 to 29 
0.093    0.093    0.093    -0.014    -0.014    -0.014   
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tenure: 30 to 34 
0.095    0.095    0.095    -0.012    -0.012    -0.012   
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tenure: 35 to 39 
0.096    0.096    0.096    -0.005    -0.006    -0.006   
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Tenure: 40 and over 
0.081    0.080    0.080    -0.001    -0.002    -0.002   
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
  Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
  Occupation dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Size of employer dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468  374,468 
Pseudo R2  0.141    0.141    0.141    0.112    0.112    0.112   
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Figure 1. Remaining Tenure: 30-year-old male regular employees who have graduated from college or 
graduate school 
 
Fresh graduate recruits (median=12.000, m ean=12.126)    
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Figure 2: The Attachment Index (AI) and training probabilities 
 
  Note: Probit regression coefficients on dummy variables  AIi  in  Pr(Trainingi = 1|AIi,RTi) =
Φ�β0 + AIiβ1 + RTiβ2� are reported on the vertical axis. Marginal effects at the means of independent 
variables are reported. All coefficients are statistically different from zero. 











Figure 3.    Remaining Tenure (RT) and training probabilities 
 
Note:  Probit regression coefficients on dummy variables RTi   in  Pr(Trainingi = 1|AIi,RTi) =
Φ�β0 + AIiβ1 + RTiβ2� are reported on the vertical axis. Marginal effects at the means of independent 
variables are reported. The coefficients for “Employment-initiated training” are significant for RT values 
from 3 and up. The coefficients for “Worker-initiated training” are significant for RT values of 1, 2, 4, 6, 
and 9 and up. 












Figure 4: Labor-market attachment and employer-initiated training by industry density 
 
Note: See Figure 2. All coefficients are statistically different from zero. 
 
Figure 5: Remaining tenure and employer-initiated training by industry density 
 
Note:    See Figure 3. The coefficients for “RT-dense” are statistically different from zero for RT values of 2, 
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